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The title of the volume edited by Lisa Zunshine, the Oxford Handbook 
of Cognitive Literary Studies (2015), suggests a combination of cognitive 
science and literary research, in which the former, used in its adjectival form, 
reads as an approach, methodology or perspective applied to analysis and 
interpretation of literary works. 
The volume does not contain a typically organised introduction 
in which each of the essays is summarised. Instead, Zunshine contributes 
“Introduction to Cognitive Literary Studies,” which gives the reader essential 
information on how the meaning of “cognitive literary studies” can or cannot 
be determined. Referring to various approaches to the term, Zunshine states 
that “[i]t is fitting then that the definition of cognitive literary studies should 
focus not on the boundaries, goals, or methods of the field but on its dynamic, 
relational nature” (Zunshine 2015: 1). “Openness and unpredictability” are 
two features which shape the manner in which cognitive literary studies are 
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developing (Zunshine 2015: 3). Zunshine mentions the experiment to which 
some of the authors were subject: 
[s]everal contributors to this volume have had the experience 
of being asked […] for just one key publication in cognitive 
approaches to literature and, along the same lines, for one 
publication in cognitive science that serves as a ‘master’ text for 
everyone doing cognitive approaches. (Zunshine 2015: 3)
As may be predicted, Zunshine immediately undermines the possibility 
of naming such titles: [t]o come up with a title or two in response to this 
question is to misrepresent the field” (Zunshine 2015: 3). To demonstrate 
her point, the editor refers to selected subjects addressed in the volume and 
the ontologically divergent fields which they represent, specifically in the 
second and fifth parts entitled “Emotions and Empathy” and “Cognitive 
Theory and Literary Experience” respectively (Zunshine 2015: vi, 3).
The massiveness of the volume may give the impression of its all-
inclusive nature. However, Zunshine makes it clear that such a way 
of thinking is wrong. She quotes the words which feature in the introduction 
to another volume published within the series of Oxford Handbooks (the 
Oxford Handbook of Social Neuroscience, Introduction by John T. Cacioppo 
and Jean Decety 2001; note in Zunshine 2015: 7) and concludes that, 
“[l]ike other volumes in this series, this Handbook offers ‘a representative 
rather than exhaustive coverage of the field’” (Zunshine 2015: 4). She then 
gives example of the introductory and orientation treatment of “visual arts, 
theatre, film, and television” (Zunshine 2015: 4). The penultimate sentence 
in the introduction expresses the idea of “openness” even more cogently: 
“[i]t is the ambition of this volume that its readers will delve deeper into 
these [“interdisciplinary”] fields while looking for new points of intersection 
that reach beyond already established areas of inquiry” (Zunshine 2015: 4).
The first part is titled “Narrative, History, Imagination,” which does 
not imply any cognitive aspect. However, the titles of minor parts do, for 
example “Cognitive Historicism.” In the first article, Mary Thomas Crane 
realises the difficulty involved in “the attempt to meld cognitive science 
with historical and cultural studies” (Crane 2015: 15) and “would argue that 
a cognitive approach to texts is more problematic in practice than in theory, 
if by practice we mean a hermeneutic practice” (Crane 2015: 18). She 
expresses her awareness that “[w]ork on the nature of fiction and narrative 
has produced many compelling theoretical arguments about why and how 
we process fictional narratives” (Crane 2015: 18). Nevertheless, “examples 
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of compelling cognitive-historicist readings of texts are more difficult to come 
by, if by ‘reading’ we mean an extended interpretive engagement with a text 
rather than relatively brief examples produced to illustrate a theoretical point” 
(Crane 2015: 18). An argument of different nature is postulated by Ellen 
Spolsky: “[t]he argument here is that only an onslaught of similar works 
has a chance of breaking through cultural defenses that denigrate works 
of imagination as inert” (Spolsky 2015: 35). She demonstrates her point 
on the basis of 16th- and 17th-century English revenge tragedies (Spolsky 
2015: 35). The section is concluded with the chapter by Natalia M. Phillips, 
who describes the process of an experiment: her text addresses
an interdisciplinary experiment in neuroscience that emerged 
alongside [her] historical research. [It] used functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI), a technology for acquiring brain 
images of neural activity, to explore the cognitive patterns that 
emerge when we read a literary work with different kinds of focus. 
(Phillips 2015: 56) 
As regards the argument, it is conveyed in the “suggestion” that 
the style and degree of focus we bring to a work of art […] can 
radically change our engagement with it, not only at the level 
of subjective aesthetic experience, but at the level of cognition, 
expressed through unique patterns of neural activation. (Phillips 
2015: 56)
The next section of the first part is called “Cognitive Narratology.” 
Peter J. Rabinowitz’s essay provides “two interlocking suggestions” 
(2015: 86): the first one is that “sequence” is not the only quality which 
makes narratives worth reading, and “favorite spots” are significant too; 
and the second one is that “there may be types of sequence that are not 
widely recognized—types of sequence that are, in fact, tied to those special 
spots” (Rabinowitz 2015: 86). The second point is linked to Rabinowitz’s 
argument: “as I argue at the end of my chapter, attention to favorite 
moments can reveal previously unrecognized alternative structures that exist 
in contestatory counterpoint with the more familiar structures we usually 
see in our favorite texts” (Rabinowitz 2015: 86). H. Porter Abbott opens his 
essay with quoting divergent opinions on the textual absences within stories, 
as expressed by Henry James and Lubomír Doležel. Then he comes up with 
his own argument: “[n]arrative gaps […] open on a vast arena of virtual 
events that are never realized but rather exist like a kind of dark, weightless 
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energy, hidden under the words and images that actualize a story” (Abbott 
2015: 104). James Phelan’s argument is that, notwithstanding the much 
“emphasised differences” between “rhetorical theorists and cognitive 
theorists,” “the two approaches can effectively collaborate,” as validated 
on the basis of “Recitatif” by Toni Morrison (Abbott 2015: 120). Alan 
Palmer’s argument is set in a different context. As he states, 
[m]y purpose here is to adopt a cognitive and narratological 
perspective on some of the stories told in three country songs and 
a traditional ballad, paying particular attention to the minds of their 
narrators and what we learn of them from their very different forms 
of self-attribution of mental states. (Palmer 2015: 136)
The argument is rephrased at the beginning of the first part of his article, 
in which he refers back to his earlier book publications and the “theory 
for the study of the novel” found there: he seeks “to argue that the ideas 
contained in that theory are equally applicable to the narratives contained 
in country songs” (Palmer 2015: 137). Monika Fludernik addresses a different 
form of artistic and cultural expression. Her essay “explores the concept 
of blending in the visual medium of the cartoon and discusses whether 
and, if so, how humor is generated by the process of blending incongruous 
scenarios” (2015: 155). As far as the argument is concerned, Fludernik 
argue[s] that although blending constitutively underwrites 
the semiosis in cartoons of types (those that are merely visual and 
those that also have textual elements), humor in cartoons relies 
more on the clash between, than on the overlap or blending of, 
incompatible frames or scenarios. (2015: 155) 
Such argumentation is reiterated in the last paragraph 
of the article: “Cartoons, one can […] argue, are a very happy hunting 
ground for an analysis of blending, humor, and narrative” (Fludernik 
2015: 170). Chapter nine, the last one in the section, is contributed by Lisa 
Zunshine, who opens her discussion with a reference to her own personal 
experience of “a mental state within a mental state within a mental state—
three nested mental states” (Zunshine 2015: 176). Then she moves on to 
the example of one of traditional Chinese novels, The Story of the Stone by 
Cao Xueqin, and expresses her argument: “I focus on nested mental states 
as units of meaning in fiction, including situations when these nested mental 
states are implied rather than described” (Zunshine 2015: 177; italics in the 
original; cf. 179). 
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Section three of Part II is called “Cognitive Queer Theory.” The argument 
of the first and the only article in the section, authored by J. Keith Vincent, 
is presented in the very first sentence: “I want to explore some ways in which 
the cognitive approach to literature may enter into a productive dialogue 
with queer theory” (Vincent 2015: 199). In other words, he “argue[s] that 
cognitive theory and queer theory share a concern with overcoming mind-
body dualism and with the strict divide between self and other” (2015: 200). 
The last section in Part I is given the title of “Neuroaesthetics,” and 
it opens with Alan Richardson’s text on “imagination” (2015: 225). 
The clearest statement of the argument is comprised in the concluding part 
of the essay: 
[j]ust as the imagery debate within cognitive science has helped 
revive literary theoretical interest in the work of imaging performed 
by readers and guided by writers, and work in conceptual metaphor 
and blending has revitalized literary studies of metaphor, so 
neuroscientific investigation of the default mode network can now 
open up literary perspectives on an extensive, multifaceted, and 
functionally dynamic imagination system. (Richardson 2015: 239) 
The concept of “imagery” is subject to discussion in the article by 
G. Gabrielle Starr, who 
argue[s] that by exploring how imagery may function in aesthetic 
responses, we may learn how aesthetic experience more broadly—
experience that reaches past (or altogether eschews) images in favor 
of, say, appreciation of epic form or the beauty of argument—may 
move us. (Starr 2015: 247) 
Her more specific “argument” is “that aesthetic experience involves 
a special instance of a bidirectional state—one that blends internally and 
externally focused modes of cognition” (Starr 2015: 247).
Part II, as already stated, is titled “Emotions and Empathy” and its 
first section bears the name “Emotions in Literature, Film, and Theater.” 
The article by Patrick Colm Hogan begins with a reference to Semir Zeki’s 
ideas of the connections between neurobiology and literary studies: 
[h]e refers what is represented in literature, along with the effects 
it has, and the activity of its production—in short, the complex 
of products and processes that comprise a work of literature. This 
complex, he maintains, tells us something directly about the nature 
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of cognition—prominently, perception and emotion. (in Hogan 
2015: 273) 
And Hogan’s essay “makes an extended argument for this point, 
specifically in connection with emotion” (Hogan 2015: 273). In the next 
article, written in the context of “cognitive cultural approach” (Plantinga 
2015: 306), Carl Plantinga 
argue[s] that studies of conventional uses and effects of faces 
in narrative film will be most fruitful when film and media studies 
incorporate what psychology, neuroscience, and other disciplines 
show about the role of the human face in social life. (Plantinga 
2015: 293) 
Plantinga’s chapter is followed by Noël Carroll’s essay titled “Theater 
and the Emotions,” in which the connection between the stage and emotional 
response is tracked across ages, and the overriding argument is “that 
if anything provides a general account of the way in which theater engages 
the emotions, it is not the notion of identification that will get the job done, 
but rather that of criterial prefocusing” (Carroll 2015: 324).
The next section, “Cognitive Postcolonial Studies,” opens with yet 
another contribution by Hogan, and his argument concerns the stance that 
“cognitive postcolonialism offers a critique of mainstream postcolonial 
theory, with its basis in psychoanalysis. Specifically, cognitive postcolonial 
theory stresses the embodied and situated nature of the human mind, as well 
as its constrained structures and processes” (Hogan 2015: 343). In the next 
article, authored by Suzanne Keen, a similar argument is expressed: “the 
literary cognitivism” implies “a potential relationship between human rights 
discourse and literary cognitivism as an alternative to postcolonial theory 
and discourse” (Keen 2015: 347). 
In the “Decision Theory and Fiction” section, there is one essay only. 
William Flesch admits that his proposition is “a complex argument,” which 
involve “decision theory” and “evolutionary game theory” (Flesch 2015: 371). 
The section is followed by “Cognitive Disability Studies,” in which Ralph 
James Savarese’s essay addresses the question of the connection between 
“poetry and autism” (2015: 393). Within his argument, Savarese “explore[s] 
the neurocosmopolitan character of poetry, focusing in particular on how 
the art form purposefully calls attention to the sensuous materiality of its 
signifiers” (2015: 395). A further argument reads “that we conceive of poetry 
as a paradoxical language of illiteracy or autism—one disproportionately 
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engaging the sensing body,” and such thinking stems from the treatment 
of “poets,” “young children,” and “preliterate people” by Julie Kane, who 
finds a similarity in “the role of the nondominant right hemisphere in the 
production of poetic language” (Savarese 2015: 400). Savarese argues that 
the “group” should also include “autistics” (Savarese 2015: 400).
The next section is “Moral Emotions,” and is opened by Margrethe 
Bruun Vaage’s chapter, in which one can find the following argument: 
[i]n relation to fiction, we seem to accept that the main character 
is a murderer—but not a rapist. Focusing on the attitude of moral 
disgust towards the rapist, I suggest there is an asymmetry between 
fiction and real life in this issue. (Vaage 2015: 421)
The author continues that “[r]ape is typically used to mark a character 
as clearly villainous in fiction—and more villainous than a murderer—while 
legally, in real life, rape is not in the same way clearly marked as being 
worse than murder” (Vaage 2015: 421). The justification that Vaage gives 
is that “that the explanation for this asymmetry between fiction and real-life 
morality is that we rely more heavily on moral emotions when engaging 
in fiction, and that rape is emotionally disturbing in a way that murder need 
not be” (Vaage 2015: 421). The chapter is followed by Fritz Breithaupt’s 
contribution on “emphatic sadism,” as the main part of the title reads 
(2015: 440). The author is aware of some “paradoxical” implication behind 
the argument: “because readers empathize with a character who is suffering, 
they can feel good themselves” (Breithaupt 2015: 440). He argues “that 
the paradoxical emotions involved in empathic sadism are not rare for readers 
of literary texts, and are moreover a key motivation for reading many literary 
texts, including certain canonical ones” (2015: 441). 
Part III, “The New Unconscious,” is not divided into sections. In the first 
essay, Blakey Vermeule’s argument is related to “some tentative steps towards 
opening up the new unconscious to literary study” (2015: 466). The article 
is followed by Jeff Smith’s treatment of “filmmakers as folk psychologists,” 
which is stated in the first part of the title. On the basis of an episode from 
the series Boardwalk Empire, Smith argues that “filmmakers sometimes act 
as folk psychologists, anticipating the kinds of responses that viewers are 
likely to have to their work” (2015: 484). He then adds that “Filmmakers 
design their products to produce particular kinds of cognitive and emotional 
responses from spectators, and in doing so, they assume that audiences will 
employ certain types of inferential routines when they engage with the film’s 
characters and situation” (Smith 2015: 484). 
164 Grzegorz Koneczniak
Part IV is titled “Empirical and Qualitative Studies of Literature” and, 
similar to Part III, does not have separate sections. It opens with the chapter 
by Laura Otis, in which the argument is linked to the “larger, qualitative 
study examining how people’s conscious experiences of thought vary” 
(Otis 2015: 506). Otis continues that “[o]ne aim of this project has been 
to learn how people differ in the visual mental images they form in response 
to spoken and written words” (2015: 506). And in the conclusion she states 
that “[r]egardless of readers’ cognitive styles, all reading experiences depend 
on the language of literary texts” (Otis 2015: 519). The next contribution 
is a collaborative effort by Marisa Bortolussi and Peter Dixon. Their argument 
is thus stated: “Although we are willing to grant that the transport metaphor 
captures important aspects of a prototypical reading experience, we conclude 
that the metaphor by itself is insufficiently precise to serve as a basis for 
theoretical advances” (2015: 525–526). As restated in the conclusion, they 
“argue that it is much more appropriate to consider each of the features that 
might be attributed to the prototypical transport experience and consider 
when and why that feature occurs” (Bortolussi and Dixon 2015: 537). 
The same authors contributed the consecutive chapter, in which the thematic 
scope of research and the argument postulated are different. As presented at 
the very beginning, 
[their] premise in this chapter is a simple, well-established 
fact: What the mind does varies over time. Because reading 
is a complex activity, this means that any account of literary reading 
must consider how the multiple components of comprehension 
and interpretation dynamically interact over the course of a text. 
(Bortolussi and Dixon 2015: 541)
The concluding part, “Cognitive Theory and Literary Experience” 
opens with Joshua Landy’s chapter “Mental Calisthenics and Self-Reflexive 
Fiction,” in which the author argues that selected “works of fiction” (Landy 
2015: 559) 
have a very specific intention: namely, to give us the opportunity 
to flex a vital mental muscle. By periodically interrupting the action 
to remind us that what we are seeing is not real, they are deliberately 
giving us practice in stepping back from our own beliefs. (Landy 
2015: 560)
The next chapter, by Elaine Auyoung, the argument concerns the role 
of “cognitive approach to the reality effect” in “changing the way we 
165The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Literary Studies:...
think about the work that novelistic details perform” and “complicat[ing] 
our fundamental conception of literary experience” (Auyoung 2015: 589). 
The penultimate chapter is authored by Mark J. Bruhn and it considers “time 
as space in the structure of (literary) experience” on the basis of Prelude 
by William Wordsworth, as the title reads (Bruhn 2015: 593; cf. 606–607). 
The last chapter, “Thick Context: Novelty in Cognition in Literature,” was 
contributed by Nancy Easterlin, whose aim is to “demonstrate how cultural 
and biopsychological factors together constitute lasting features of literary 
originality” (2015: 613), and whose argument is that “cognitive-evolutionary 
explanation in combination with cultural understanding establishes a thick 
context, so to speak, for the analysis of cultural phenomena” (Easterlin 
2015: 613).
Zunshine’s volume is almost 700 pages long and it is particularly 
praiseworthy because of the variety of arguments explored in the 
30 essays: on the one hand, and in accordance with Zunshine’s point expressed 
in the introduction, they are centripetal in terms of the directions in which 
they evolve; on the other hand, they are linked through multiple references 
to the authors’ texts, and both inside and outside the volume. Such referential 
and collaborative practices are also visible on the “Acknowledgements” 
page, which indicates that the selection of authors is not haphazard. 
The “editor has had many occasions to appreciate the creativity and patience 
of its contributors” (Zunshine 2015: ix), which implies that the volume is not 
a compilation of unrelated articles sent as a result of general call-for-papers 
policy. The authors could cooperate with each other on account of “the 
website that enabled the authors to read each other’s drafts” (2015: ix). 
The volume should thus be treated as a thematically concise and coherent 
monograph whose authors could genuinely participate in the development 
of the book. And such authentic and synchronic participation is visible in the 
way in which the authors refer to each other’s texts (see, for example, Crane 
2015: 15; Rabinowitz 2015: 86; Abbott 2015: 111; Vincent 2015: 215) and 
in the separate acknowledgments placed at the end of most of the chapters.
The research background and experience of the contributors should 
also be commented on. Information on the authors (2015: xi–xv) precedes 
the introduction. Most of the contributors are academic scholars who 
represent universities in the United States. Yet, there are also authors affiliated 
with British, Canadian, German, French, and Israeli teaching and research 
centres. In most cases they are Professors of English, of other languages, and 
of literatures. Alan Palmer is an exception, as he “is an independent scholar 
living in Weardale, County Durham” (2015: xiii). Some of the authors are 
described as combining cognitive science and literature in their research: 
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 Elaine Auyoung (the University of Minnesota), Marisa Bortolussi (the 
University of Alberta), Nancy Easterlin (the University of New Orleans), Patrick 
Colm Hogan (the University of Connecticut), Suzanne Keen (Washington 
and Lee University), Natalie M. Phillips (Michigan State University), Alan 
Richardson (Boston College), and Ellen Spolsky (Bar-Ilan University, Israel) 
(2015: xi–xv). Thus the edited Handbook is not their first encounter with 
the possibility of applying cognitive science within literary research, and 
the reader can expect valid interpretations, supported by frequent references 
to previous texts and research. As regards the editor, in her biographical note, 
her book titled Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies is enumerated 
(2015: xv), which proves that her research extends beyond cognitive literary 
studies and moves into cognitive discussions of other artefacts of culture. 
The list of contributors also includes experts in philosophy and psychology, 
the fields linked to cognitive science, and popular culture. Such eclectic 
academic backgrounds demonstrate the interdisciplinary nature of cognitive 
research and its plentiful possibilities for literary studies, as demonstrated 
in the arguments explored and as postulated by Zunshine in the introduction 
to the Handbook.
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